

# Botnets

How (not) to count the Internet.

# The Mirai Botnet Attacks

**theguardian**

DDoS attack that disrupted internet was largest of its kind in history, experts say

Dyn, the victim of last week's denial of service attack, said it was orchestrated using a weapon called the Mirai botnet as the 'primary source of malicious attack'

- [Major cyber attack disrupts internet service across Europe and US](#)



# The Mirai Botnet Attacks



**World's largest 1 Tbps DDoS Attack launched from 152,000 hacked Smart Devices**

📅 Tuesday, September 27, 2016 👤 Swati Khandelwal

# The Mirai Botnet Attacks



# Denial of Service - DoS

Prevent legitimate users from accessing a service...

# Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS

Prevent legitimate users from accessing a service...

...using a distributed network, e.g. a Botnet.

Usually by sending a lot of packets.

# DDoS Attack Examples

- Syn flood attack.
- Reflector attack.
- ...

# Syn flood attack






Image Source: Wikipedia






# Reflection attack



# Botnet Topology



Source: Spamalytics: An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion, Kanich et al.

# Topology Attributes

- Command latency
- Resilience
- Bot awareness
- Planning

# Star

Command latency (+)

Resilience (-)

Bot awareness(-)

Planning (+)




# Multi Server

Command latency (+)

Resilience (+)

Bot awareness(-)

Planning (-)




# Hierarchical

Command latency (-)

Resilience (+)

Bot awareness(+)

Planning (+)




# Random P2P

Command latency (-)

Resilience (+)

Bot awareness(-)

Planning (+)



# Botnet Communication

- No communication
- Public channels
- Private channels
- Hybrid



# How Do Bots Find The Master?

- IP flux
- Domain flux

# IP Flux

Fully qualified domain name. *e.g. mypc.atl.damballa.com*

Constantly change IP address of this domain.

Single flux vs. double flux

# Domain Flux

Inverse of IP flux

Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs)

# DGA Example - TorPig

- Three fixed domains to be used if all else fails.
- Daily/weekly domain name (dd/wd)
- Every 20 minutes bot attempts to connect (in order) to:
  - wd.com, wd.net, wd.biz
  - dd.com, dd.net, dd.biz
  - the three fixed domains

Source: <http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~kemm/courses/cs177/torpig.pdf>

# Newly Infected Device – What Now?

Persist, avoid detection

Social attacks

Eventually aggressive attacks

Rent it to someone else

# Paper 1: Botnets As A Service

Analysed traffic across the globe.

Labeled IPs to known botnets.

Source: Characterizing Botnets-as-a-Service, Chang et al.


# Characteristics

Size

Stability

Elasticity

Source: Characterizing Botnets-as-a-Service, Chang et al.



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# Botnet Trends

Large botnets have dynamic stability.

Large botnets tend to be more elastic.

Botnets collaborate.

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Botnets collaborate?

# What Does This Remind You Off?

- Service based
- Scalable
- Elastic
- Metered
- Redundant
- Highly available

“Cloud  
Computing”

Are Botnets Always Bad?

# Paper 2: Internet Census 2012

Count number of used IPs.

Used a botnet for scanning.

Published anonymously in March 2013

# Carna Botnet

“Carna was the roman goddess for the protection of inner organs and health and was later confused with the goddess of doorsteps and hinges. This name seems like a good choice for a bot that runs mostly on embedded routers.”

# The Beginning

Discovered vulnerable devices when playing around with nmap scripting engine.

Scanned on port 23.

Small binary loaded into vulnerable devices.

in one night ~30 thousand devices infected.

# Implementation – Be Nice!

- Don't change passwords.
- No permanent changes.
- Limited scanning speed to ~10 IPs/s.
- Added a Readme file.



# Found Devices

Routers, set-top boxes ~25%

IPSec routers, BGP routers,  
industrial control systems,  
door security systems,... ~75%

# Targets

- Only Routers and set-top boxes
- Approx. 420k devices infected
- Some Bots act as middle nodes (proxies)

# Tools


- Binary written in C
- Web Interface written in PHP
- Python scripts
- Apache Hadoop with PIG to handle data

# Scanning Methods

- ICMP ping
- Reverse DNS
- Nmap SYN scans
- Nmap service probes
- Traceroute

# Scanning Methods

- ICMP ping  
52 billion probes
- Reverse DNS  
10.5 billion stored records
- Nmap SYN scans  
2.8 billion records for ~660 million IPs with 71 billion ports tested
- Nmap service probes  
4000 billion probes sent, ~175 billion answered
- Traceroute  
68 million records



# Surprises

Suspicious Binary in /tmp folder

AIDRA: Classic Botnet with IRC CnC Server



Over 250KB size

Less bots than Carna

# Analysis

MAP OF THE INTERNET  
THE IPv4 SPACE, 2006



0 1 14 15 16 19 →  
 3 2 13 12 17 18  
 4 7 8 11  
 5 6 9 10






# Analysis

MAP OF THE INTERNET  
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# Authors Comments

“nobody would connect that to the Internet, really nobody”  
there are at least 1000 people who did.

“that shouldn't be on the Internet but will probably be found a few  
times”

it's there a few hundred thousand times. Like half a million printers, or  
a Million Webcams,...

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there are at least 1000 people who did.

“that shouldn't be on the Internet but will probably be found a few  
times”

it's there a few hundred thousand times. Like half a million printers, or  
a Million Webcams, **or devices that have root as a root password.”**

# So How Big Is The Internet?

- 420 Million pingable IPs.
- 36 Million that had one or more ports open.
- 141 Million IPs firewalled.
- 729 Million more IPs just had reverse DNS records.

Total **~1.3 billion** IPs in use.

# Conclusion

“...to our knowledge, the largest and most comprehensive IPv4 census ever.”

No, it's not.

Bigger Census done in 2004, 2009,...

“We hope other researchers will find the data we have collected useful”

Difficult to say.

# Problems With This Work

- Hard to verify
- Technically illegal

Krenc et al.

“CAIDA has confirmed that the scanning took place”

Reverse DNS: separate, external dataset from Nov 2012

95.2% exact matches




# ICMP Dataset

- 2 claims: complete scans within 24h and scans over six weeks  
“from June 2012 to October 2012” no data from June/July!
- report states 52 billion probes, the data set only contains 49.5 billion probes
- Almost no metadata available

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“from June 2012 to October 2012” no data from June/July!

- report states probes
- Almost no me



contains 49.5 billion

# Finding The Scans

Analysing the probed IPs:

At most one complete scan possible .

Estimated between 1 and 12 “complete” scans.




Figure 5: Overlapping iterations: First nine iterations over the probed address range in *icmp<sub>2</sub>*.




Figure 7: Finding *fast scans*: Sum of probes in 48h-sliding window over entire measurement period.

# Real Size Of The Internet?

Not all reverse DNS entries are actually used.

Mixing incoherent measurement periods.

Number of IPs “in use” not necessarily equal to the size of the Internet.

IPs who do not respond to probes not necessarily “unused”.

# Open Questions

Botnets are powerful, but illegal.

Can they still be used for good?

Using Botnets (even for research purposes) is unethical.

Should the data be used?

Questions?

# What do you think?

Botnets are powerful, but illegal.

Can they still be used for good?

Using Botnets (even for research purposes) is unethical.

Should the data be used?