

Chapter 3

Specification models:

High-level modeling techniques and related analysis methods for the computer assisted verification of DES



Computer Engineering and
Networks Laboratory

Discrete Event Systems

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Motivation (1)



- **Modern systems consist of many different components (HW + SW !), yielding a very high degree of complexity**
- **Systems have to fulfill a set of requirements, defined by a specification as given by a contractor, customer or legislation**
- **What are these kinds of requirements?**
 - Functionality:
Coke vending machines either delivers drink or returns my money
 - Performance:
Voice-of-IP requires max. delay of a IP-packet < xxx msec.
 - Energy-consumption, heating characteristics
 - Reliability: 99,999% of emergency calls must be routed correctly
 - Safety / Security requirements (can be seen as part of functionality)
 - Economic requirements: costs, amortization etc.


Motivation (1)



Why do we need more sophisticated methods other than finite state machines?

- States are atomic
 - no hierarchic structuring possible
 - usage of variables
- Partitioning of systems in (parallel operating) components not possible
 - modularization?
- FSM are easily very large and thus not human readable anymore

Motivation (3)



Computer-assisted analysis/verification (1)



What's the general strategy for formally and automatically analyzing models?

1. Take a design of the system behavior, given as some high-level model such as an SDL specification, PN, network of TA, or
2. Take (a set of) formal system requirements, e.g. given in terms of a set of Message Sequence Charts, as safety or progress properties, ...
3. Validate that each requirement is indeed satisfied by the system design.

This will be covered here

Computer-assisted analysis/verification (2)



What are the techniques for formally analyzing models?

1. Theorem proving

- Strategy: generate a formal proof that D satisfies ϕ .
- Applicable if design D can be represented in some adequate mathematical theory

2. State space exploration

- **Strategy: check systematically and exhaustively each reachable state in D satisfies ϕ .**
- **Applicable if the behavior of D can be finitely represented.**
- **One is enabled to show the presence and absence of errors!**

3. Simulation or Testing of models

- Strategy: Check whether ϕ holds on some executions of D .
- Applicable if D is in some sense executable.
- **One may be able to show the presence of errors, but not the absence!**

(State-based) Computer-assisted analysis/verification (3)




What are the requirements to be verified (by state-based methods)?

- 1. Safety:** A safety property to be verified asserts that a system under analysis never reaches a (set of) dedicated state, e.g. like error states, or in particular a deadlock. The mutual exclusion property is one of the most prominent examples of a safety property.
(constraint on finite behaviour)
- 2. Liveness or progress:** A liveness property guarantees that a system under analysis is executing a (set) of dedicated activities infinitely often
(constraint on infinite behaviour)
- 3. Starvation** exists if there is an infinite run, where a dedicated action is never executed.

Dijkstra'71: Dining Philosophers Problem
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dining_philosophers_problem

(State-based) Computer-assisted analysis/verification (4)



(State-based) Computer-assisted analysis/verification (5)



Does a design D satisfy a requirement ϕ ?

What are the practical obstacle?

☞ **Space and CPU-time is limited**

- State Space Explosion:
The number of possible state combinations *exponentially* in the number of concurrent processes or independent activities.
- Captures your model the reality ?
– You can only assert those properties which are captured by the model.
– Consistency check between model and reality (= model validation, not covert here).

☞ **Validation of model**

What's the principal obstacle?

- Decidability:
full generality it is undecidable whether D satisfies ϕ .
This depends on the specification, and the requirement.

☞ **Halting problem**

Validation \leftrightarrow Verification



- Validation (“doing right things”)
 - Comparing theory to reality
 - Make observation for providing evidence that the theory is correct, e.g.
 - show the absence of a specific error in different runs
 - show that program delivers correct result with respect to a given input
 - If possible try to find counter-examples (Falsification)

- Verification (“doing things right”)
 - Proof correctness of system design
 - formal model with unique interpretation
 - formal system, i.e. formal model and unique set of deductive rules for operating on (or transforming) the model.
 - If incorrect behavior is detected, counter-example is automatically provided

Specification Models (at glance)



- **Systems have to fulfill a set of requirements, defined by a specification as given by a contractor, customer or legislation**
- **Showing (proving) a dedicated behavior of a system needs exhaustive analysis:**
 - **Testing, monitoring and simulation of real system or a model is in principle not sufficient (rare events?)**
- **Verification of systems require their formal description**
- **What does formal mean?**
 - **Model posses a unique interpretation (unique set of deductive rules to operate on the model)**
- **Drawback: Reality far from trivial**
=> level of detail bounded by capabilities of (mathematically) handling a model (run-time and memory is limited)
- **Abstraction:**
Keep models simple as possible but as complex as necessary!
You can only check what you have modeled!



Early versions of UML-state charts ?

What are we doing?



- **Lecture 23.10:**
 - **Specification and Description Language SDL**
 - **Message Sequence Charts**
 - Related Analysis methods: The TAU-Tool-suite
- **Lecture 30.10:**
 - **Petri Nets**
 - **Symbolic Analysis methods (for finite models)**
- **Lecture: 6.11:**
 - **Timed Automata**
 - **Introduction to model checking**